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The State You’re In: Citizenship,
Sovereign Power, and The (Political)
Rescue of the Self in Kazuko
Kuramoto’s Manchurian Legacy
Andrea Pacor
O my country and my home,
I pray I never lack a city,
never face a hopeless life
one filled with misery and pain.
Before that comes, let death,
my death, deliver me,
bring my days to their fatal end.
For there’s no affliction worse
than losing one’s own country.
Chorus, from Euripides’s Medea
1 Manchurian Legacy: Memoirs of a Japanese Colonist (1999) is the English-language memoir of
Kazuko Kuramoto, a woman of Japanese ancestry born in colonial Manchuria in 1927, who
was forcefully repatriated after the collapse of the Japanese empire in the Second World
War.  Repatriation began a trying time of adjusting to harsh post-war conditions in a
homeland Kuramoto found, in many ways, foreign and inhospitable. Eventually, she set
out to acquire US citizenship, thereby embracing a new national identity that appeared to
function on a voluntaristic  rather than an ethnic basis.  This  voluntaristic  element is
crucial in granting Kuramoto access to the naturalization that postcolonial China could
not  concede,  especially  to  a  daughter  of  former  colonial  masters.  The  biopolitical
relevance  of  this  memoir,  I  argue,  emerges  from each radical  change in  Kuramoto’s
circumstances marking a fracture in her relation with a sovereign state entity, beginning
with the loss of her colonial identity as a Japanese citizen in Manchuria, and culminating
with the restoration of political and ontological security in her acquisition of American
citizenship.
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2 The emergence of  modern autobiography as a genre,  its  reception and criticism,  are
crucially linked to the idea of national identity as a principle of social aggregation and
political legitimacy. Indeed, several literary traditions have claimed a special affinity with
a form that transcends the mere record of a life to express a collective identity in all its
historical and cultural specificity. American literary critics, for instance, have noted that
autobiography enters  the western literary canon more or  less  concurrently with the
establishment of the Unites States as a new political subject, implicitly casting the entire
form as  the  manifestation of  the  desire  for  self-government  of  the  American nation
(Olney  377–378).  In  this  usage,  the  terms  “American  nation”  or  “America”  become
shorthand for  the  complex  political,  economic  and cultural  processes  leading  to  the
gradual creation of the new nation-state. As a result, a causal link is commonly assumed
between the cultural nation and the body politic, whereby the latter is empowered and
enabled by a rising to political self-consciousness in the former. Autobiography’s role is,
then, to affirm a synecdochical relation between the autobiographical self and the nation,
and to chronicle the degree and manner of the self’s inclusion in the collective entity.
This is not intended reductively. Life writing in America, say, from Benjamin Franklin to
Malcolm X, Anais Nin to Maxine Hong Kingston, covers a spectrum that is both broad and
deep. It is broad to the extent that it represents subjectivities adopting a mainstream,
marginal  or  oppositional  stance;  it  is  deep as  new contributions  challenge  a  naively
normative reading of past autobiographies, and encourage the recurring revision of the
existing paradigm of national identification and its founding myths.
3 In this spectrum, Kazuko Kuramoto’s Manchurian Legacy is a textual prism that refracts
with  particular  intensity  the  political  nature  of  the  mechanisms  through  which  the
individual constructs a viable selfhood that is then validated in a relation of reciprocal
recognition with the nation. In the modern world, the nation is the largest social group to
remain open to individual identification; a group that is simultaneously abstracted in the
concept of sovereign power and reified in the territorial boundedness of the state. In
writers like Benjamin Franklin and Henry Adams the autobiographical act carries the
subject’s implicit claim to representativeness and relevance to the national discourse;
Kuramoto  is  denied  access  to  this  salvific  stance.  This  is  because  the  canonical
autobiographical  text  does not  generally function as a plea,  a  sort  of  application for
acceptance in the national body, but as the belated justification of an already established
presence. What is usually at stake is the self’s relative centrality within the social, cultural
and political order to which one already feels one belongs. Not so with Kuramoto, for
whom personal history intersects multiple crises of political sovereignty deriving from a
dramatic  failure  of  state  power;  crises  in  which  the  required  isomorphism between
individual and nation (the reified collective self) can only be (re)constituted through a
radical  ideological  realignment  towards  a  new  political  referent.  Such  forceful
detachment of the self from the polis may derive from banishment, denationalization,
genocide, civil war, catastrophic military defeat of the state of reference, occupation of
the national territory by a foreign force, colonial and post-colonial displacement, or any
other instance that severs the crucial relationship of reciprocal recognition between the
individual and sovereign power.
4 This  analysis  will  highlight  elements  in  Kuramoto’s  autobiographical  narrative  that
intimate how, during the Second World War and in its aftermath, she finds herself in a
zone  of  indeterminacy  where  the  political  underpinnings  of  national  identification
dissolve. In the crisis, both the political mediation of national identity and the formal
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protection  of  the  law  become  inaccessible  to  the  individual,  leaving  her  to  stand
completely vulnerable,  as naked life,  before the constitutive (rather than constituted)
thrust of sovereign violence (Benjamin). This violence inevitably brings to the surface the
original bio-political relation theorized by Giorgio Agamben and located in what he calls
the “grey zone” of modern politics.
5 In the newly emerged bio-political relation, Agamben argues, the biological body which
sustains and carries human life is never simply left to itself, but always incorporated in
the calculations of sovereign power. In turn, this sovereign concern for the citizen’s body
produces (calls into being),  in specific locations and under precise circumstances, the
naked  life  of  the  homo  sacer as  the  threshold  where  nature  and  culture  are
articulated.This  articulation,  Agamben  continues,  occurs  in  a  zone  of  indistinction
between  inside  and  outside  where  banishment  takes  the  peculiarly  modern  and
paradoxically legalistic form of the state of exception. In this state, or zone, political and
ontological categories become fluid, bodies become malleable and open to fundamental
re-inscription, with radical consequences for the subjects involved. This vulnerability and
indeterminacy structures the traumatic experience Kazuko Kuramoto has recorded in her
memoir. In turn, the memoir itself becomes the instrument of a recovery of the self under
the  postulate  (empirically  verified  by  Kuramoto)  that  the  personal  cannot  function
without the political.  The rub lies in Kuramoto’s unintentional proof that it  does not
matter  which  state-structure  picks  up  the  other  end  of  the  lifeline  cast  by  the
autobiographical subject, as long as one does. Once this is accomplished, the self is, once
again, biopolitically anchored.
6 The bio-political paradigm, originally developed by Foucault to explain modern power
and its need for docile bodies (Foucault 140–143), is not, however, transparent to the
autobiographical  subject.  The latter is  too intensely engaged in the construction of a
coherent  and  autonomous  individuality  in  the  residual  space  between  the  limited
demands of an intermediate social circle like the family, and the total demands of the
nation-state. In part, this opacity stems from the pathos of nationalist discourse which
labors to conceal the true nature of the bio-political relation. Only the loss of a political
referent  in  the  national  state,  either  through  expatriation,  denationalization,
banishment, or dissolution, can reveal how vertiginous the stakes are for the individual
who stands to lose everything: identity and solidarity, freedom and possibility, and life.
The stakes are high because, as Georg Simmel notes, the modern state seeks to undermine
the internal cohesion of all intermediate groups which may function as alternative and
(reasonably) self-sustaining social and economic structures. 
7 This restructuring of family relations occurs, historically, as the modern state seeks a
more direct rapport with the individual, bypassing all other social groups. For Simmel,
the Platonic ideal state has “merely extended this line of development by dissolving the
family altogether, setting in place of this intermediate structure only individuals, on the
one hand, and the state,  on the other” (Simmel 274).  In this project,  the category of
citizenship is deployed to make the individualized subject directly visible to sovereign
power in an unequal relation of reciprocal recognition that validates primarily the nation
state  and  only  secondarily  our  identity.  As  Hannah  Arendt  notes,  when  the  French
Revolution  constituted  naked  human  life  as  the  bearer  of  universal  rights  in  the
declaration of 1789, this mere existence was immediately subsumed in the qualified life of
the citizen (Arendt 293). 
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8 Arendt’s work reveals that what it means to be human, and consequently the bearer of
“human rights,” is never, at any point, a settled question. This is because “humanity” is
not  an  essential  quality  possessed  by  the  subject  but  a  battleground  on  which  the
individual’s inclusion in this category is decided. As a result, the concept, one that is
frequently  deployed  in  a  variety  of  political  discourses  (past  and  present),  is
fundamentally unstable, except for its concrete effects through modern legal frameworks
of citizenship. The crucial question, here, is whether anything of value is left when the
category of citizenship becomes inaccessible to the individual. Kuramoto’s memoir raises
fundamental doubts on the possibility of answering in the affirmative and bears witness
to a modern catastrophe in which our collective political  and cultural  values do not
measure up to our yearning (sincere or otherwise) to discover a universal humanity in
ourselves and in others. 
9 As a modern individual, Kuramoto finds herself positioned between state and nation, and
is held there by national identity’s dependence, for historical viability, on control of a
newly established or existing state structure (cf. Breuilly, Gellner, Giddens, Hobsbawn,
and Kedourie). The addition of the national dimension to the toolbox of political power
has thus allowed the industrial, technocratic, and sovereign state to extend its already
formidable hold on the productive body of the citizen-subject beyond the discipline of
labor, military exercise and punishment, to the ideological determination of the ultimate
limits of self, conscience and ethics. The nation-state’s leverage on the individual is two-
pronged:  by extending or withholding positive reinforcement,  it  exploits our need to
establish reciprocal relations with larger social circles; by threatening divestiture of the
national  attribute  and,  thus,  complete  dehumanization  (the  subject  becomes  a  non-
person),  it  exploits  the  primacy  of  state-sanctioned  national  identity  as  the  sole
recognized marker of inclusion and sole legal vehicle of associated rights (Arendt 290–
302;  Agamben, Homo 126–135).  In turn, by documenting how Kuramoto’s identity was
questioned,  negated,  derailed  and  reconstituted,  Manchurian  Legacy exemplifies  the
functioning of these technologies of power in an array of concrete situations that only a
rare  combination  of  exclusion,  mobility,  necessity  and  possibility  can  bring  to  the
foreground.
10 The  ties  between self-definition  (even  fruition  of  the  self)  and  national  identity  are
revealed in the opening chapter of the memoir and remain a central concern throughout.
Kazuko Kuramoto was born in Dairen, currently Dalian, in eastern Manchuria, in 1927,
the daughter of the local representative of the Japanese imperial government. Japan had
acquired the city at the close of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and kept it until the
arrival of Soviet forces, in 1945. Thus, Kuramoto forms her sense of self and of the ties
that bind her to the larger social group in a province of the Empire where, as a member of
the ruling elite, she enjoys significant privileges. But once the shield of colonial power is
removed, with the Japanese defeat in World War II, these privileges abruptly come to an
end and Kuramoto experiences a dramatic reversal of status from ruling class to refugee;
from highest to lowest on the value scale of political relevance.i But let us proceed in
order.
11 Manchurian Legacy revealingly sets off with a chapter entitled “The Young Patriot” in
which Kuramoto introduces her family as it is being engulfed in the general mobilization
of Japanese society for all-out war in the Pacific. Two brothers had already been drafted
in the service of the Emperor, and now, close to graduation from a junior college for girls,
Kazuko also wishes to do her part by enlisting in the Japanese Red Cross Nurse Corps. Her
The State You’re In: Citizenship, Sovereign Power, and The (Political) Rescue...
European journal of American studies, 11-2 | 2016
4
admiration for the uniformed girl portrayed on the recruitment poster matches the tone
and rhetoric of the propaganda to which she was exposed at school. The image before her
speaks of romantic adventure, independence, and loyal commitment to the supreme good
of  the  nation.  To  the  attentive  reader,  it  also  suggests  that  while  the  discursive
production  of  modern  identity  remains  heavily  gendered,  the  distinction  between
masculine and feminine roles is much less pronounced than in traditional society. The
modern state,  with its  vast pragmatic needs,  favors the erosion of  old strictures and
empowers individuals to stand up to anachronistic social models based on a relation of
direct and exclusive subordination to the larger subject. Of course, this realignment of
individual loyalty occurs at the expense of intermediate social circles like the family. The
latter’s system of mechanical solidarity can hardly compete with a political entity which
recognizes the individual as the direct subject of sovereign power, bypassing all other
social ties.
12 The disruptive force of state nationalism within the family manifests itself the moment
Kazuko informs her parents she plans to join the Red Cross. The moment she voices her
patriotic intentions, her mother and father are divested of their parental authority by the
power of nationalist discourse which posits the nation as the highest moral and social
value. Clearly, the force of this disruption does not stem from the specific institution (in
this case the Red Cross), where power is directed inward at controlling the recruit, but
from the state as the political entity that accords its many apparatuses legitimacy, unity
of purpose and direction. Whereas separate institutions exercise specialized technologies
of power and of the self to fulfill equally specialized functions (i.e. training nurses or
soldiers),  the  nation-state,  as  a  transcendent  whole  (transcending  its  bureaucratic
subdivisions, that is), provides the affective focus of wide-circle social bondedness. 
13 The individual, however, is not entirely powerless in this relation. Modern bureaucracy,
economy, and warfare are all organized on the industrial model and thus necessitate the
direct involvement of unprecedented numbers in all aspects of state life. The energies
released by the mobilization of  the masses to political  and economic ends invariably
accentuate the total character of the state, expressed in administrative form, which must
now  respond  to  the  increased  (though  diffused)  bargaining  power  of  the  general
population.  Due  to  the  political  risks  involved in  such bargaining,  the  modern state
develops  apparatuses  and  technologies  for  the  production  of  loyalty  based  on  the
biopolitical idea that national homogeneity is a necessity which guarantees the biological
life of the nation in the continuing political life of the state; the two become homologous.
For this ideological operation to succeed, however, the nation must be naturalized. To
this end, nationalist rhetoric deploys paternalistic analogies between the nation and the
family which must constantly and simultaneously both co-opt and undermine parental
authority to foster a sentiment of exclusive loyalty towards the state.
14 Unsurprisingly, though with little enthusiasm, Kuramoto’s parents capitulate. They are,
Kazuko senses subconsciously, trapped in a web of nationalist discourse which threatens
to alienate their daughter if,  by resisting her wishes, they force everyone involved to
acknowledge the fundamental conflict of interests between family and nation in these
specific circumstances. Neither Kazuko nor, for that matter, her parents, are equipped to
see through to the biopolitical nature of the conflict. This is evident when the young
volunteer is at a loss before her mother’s anguish. After all, she felt entitled to the same
joyful parting ceremony her brothers had received when drafted into the Imperial Army,
which involved a celebratory red rice meal and a war hero’s public farewell to the triple
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cry  of  Tenno-heika,  Banzai!  (Long  live  the  Emperor).  At  seventeen,  Kuramoto’s
autobiographical  persona  fails  to  discern  her  family’s  true  feelings  about  the  war.
Nevertheless,  her  recollection of  her  brother,  Kay’s,  send-off  records  a  clear  note  of
sarcasm amidst the toasting and singing. Kay and his friends subvert the traditional cry
to the Emperor (ideally, a Japanese soldier’s last words before heroic death) to honor
Kay’s mother instead. Emboldened by the rice wine, they cry out: "Okaa-san, Banzai! (Long
live Mother!)" (Kuramoto 3).
15 This is not to say that familial loyalty is an inevitable biological fact; only that, in the
development of individual consciousness, it takes precedence over socialization in the
larger group. It will thus continue to maintain a primary claim on an individual’s sense of
obligation, security, and trust. In this regard, Kuramoto’s memoir clearly shows the traces
of the conflict between the (for us moderns) irresistible biopolitical demand of national
affiliation and the mechanical  urgency of  familial  loyalty.  Gradually,  Kazuko realizes
family and nation are not as homologous as nationalist discourse claims them to be.
16 This  contraposition  cannot  be  productively  understood  by  applying  the  classical
distinction between public and private on which the bourgeois theory of self and society
is predicated, for it is too likely to derail analysis into false and simplistic dichotomies.
Georg  Simmel  provides  a  more  sophisticated  heuristic  in  what  he  calls  the
“differentiation drive.” Individuals, he maintains, are “surrounded by concentric circles
of special interests”; not just two, like in the opposition of public to private, but many
(Simmel 261). The self is thus embattled between, on the one hand, the individual search
for  autonomy  and  freedom  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  conflicting  demands  of
intermediate social circles like the family, and large social circles like the caste, party, or
nation.  The  literary  translation  of  these  tensions  reveals  how,  for  the  modern
autobiographical  self,  the  allure  of  the  national  state  is  unmatched  in  breadth  and
intensity,  also  because  “the  larger  circle  encourages  individual  freedom,  the  smaller
restricts it” (Simmel 269).
17 Simmel’s differentiation drive proceeds in two directions: toward individualization and
toward nondifferentiation (identity). As social groups increase in complexity, so increases
internal differentiation between the entities that constitute them. The complexity of this
model is immediately apparent if one considers, with Simmel, that the differentiation
drive is not exclusive to the psychological person and her relations, but applies equally to
groups. Like persons, groups also strive for individuality that can only come from internal
cohesion.  Such  cohesion,  however,  comes  at  the  expense  of  internal  differentiation
between individuals whose identity with one another (nondifferentiation) is stressed over
their autonomy. The more complex and large the social group, the more it accentuates
internal  differentiation.  This  creates  favorable  conditions for  the  development  of
individual freedom where smaller groups would restrict it. This very process, however,
diminishes the individuality of large groups that come to resemble other entities at the
same level of structural complexity (thus, different states resemble each other more than
any state resembles the social groups that constitute it, like, for instance, the family).
18 Applied to national identity, Simmel’s heuristic reveals that a large group like the nation
may yearn for an autobiography of its own. In political terms, to argue that a social group
possesses a distinct national character, a self, is, concomitantly, a claim for national self-
determination and sovereignty to be realized through the seizing or establishing of a
concrete state structure. Conversely, on the cultural level, national identity functions as
an enormous echo chamber for projects of individual self-narration or self-invention, but
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only when these are aligned, ideologically, with the larger framework. When they are not,
such attempts are considered to be irrelevant, displaced, competing claims from non-
conforming subjects who may have to be ignored, relocated or silenced.
19 Kuramoto’s stint in the Red Cross introduces her to the loudest part of the cultural echo
chamber  linking  the  individual  to  the  nation.  The  retrospective  mode  of  the
autobiographical act, however, reveals that this experience only accentuates Kuramoto’s
sense that the demands made on the individual by family and nation may be, at crucial
times,  incongruous.  She begins  to  notice  fissures  in the dominant  national  narrative
when the glamour of  war is  diminished by the depersonalizing strategies of  military
training and, especially, by the clear disparity between war as existential fact and its
ideological representation. Although she never experiences combat,  the dire need for
medical personnel at the front prompts the school to admit her (and her cohort) to early
hospital training. This involves the dissection of a cadaver, a Chinese “coolie,” which
provokes  the  most  intense  reactions  in  the  young  women in  her  class,  both  to  the
materiality of death and the dehumanizing effects of using an “other” (doubly so as non-
Japanese and as corpse) as a pedagogical tool. Under institutional pressure, however, any
temptation to generalize their revulsion is immediately suppressed: “None of us talked
about this experience during the rest of the day, going through the motion of daily tasks
as if  nothing had happened” (Kuramoto 7).  Only at night,  in their beds,  shrouded by
darkness, they dare vent their distress with sobs and whimpers that, having no audience,
remain empty of immediate political content.
20 In the Red Cross, like in the Army, the process of indoctrination in the national ideal
reaches the operational limits of mere ideology and becomes more overt, harsher, less
subtle.  It  is  here  that,  for  Kuramoto to  resist  total  conformity  and the  concomitant
flattening of the self on a particular institutional role, she must adopt an oppositional
stance toward authority.  The individual,  as Erving Goffman argues,  is  not completely
determined by his or her identification with, and commitment to a particular social unit
or organizational  structure;  she is,  rather,  a  “stance-taking entity” that always seeks
some “elbow room” for the development of an autonomous self (Goffman 319–320). Total
institutions  like  Kuramoto’s  Red  Cross  tend  to  encroach  on  this  elbow  room,  make
opposition unbearably costly, and force the individual to redefine her own selfhood by
severely shifting the balance between nondifferentiation and individualization toward
the former; toward identity (with others) and sameness. When no residual space is left,
and the individual is reduced to a sheer state of necessity, a figure akin to the Muselmann
can be produced; this figure, often mentioned by survivors of the Shoah as the last stage
of dehumanization, as a form of living death before death, is the material foundation on
which  Giorgio  Agamben  theorizes  the  liminal  bio-political  figure  of  the  homo  sacer
(Agamben, Homo).
21 If Goffman’s model is applied to the individual’s identification with the national state,
however, where can the necessary oppositional space, the elbow room, be found? Is there
a viable “outside” to the nation? Kuramoto’s decision to join the Red Cross is only the
first step toward a crisis that will force her to come to terms with this problem, while her
circumstances  as  a  Manchurian  Nisei  (second  generation  Japanese  expatriate)  make
conventional, hyper-patriotic solutions unavailable or unacceptable to her.
22 Kazuko’s desire to serve in the military state apparatus unmasks a disquieting disparity
between the official rhetoric of Japanese femininity, derived from traditional models that
emphasize purity and submissiveness, and the readiness with which this rhetoric is set
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aside for the sake of achieving the state’s operational and strategic goals. This ideological
disharmony surfaces  in the memoir  when a baffled cousin Toru can only rationalize
Kazuko’s decision to join the auxiliaries as an attempt to overcome social strictures on
feminine behavior. His perplexity becomes even greater when he tries to make light of
her “playing soldier” and is informed that they (for she is no longer an individual but part
of a group) had received drills from a regular army sergeant. Expressing the surprise of a
society  not  yet  entirely  up  to  speed  with  the  necessities  of  the  modern state,  Toru
exclaims: “Drills? Girls doing drills?” (Kuramoto 23).
23 Induction in the Red Cross marks Kazuko’s  transition from the relative autonomy of
civilian life to a regime that shows many of the characteristics of a total institution. As a
cadet nurse she is segregated from her habitual social surroundings, including family and
friends,  and  is  integrated  in  a  regime  that  leaves  no  room  for  the  expression  of
individuality  or  dissent.  In  this  regime  (or  regimen)  all  activities  conform  to  a
comprehensive rational plan, fulfill specific goals, are collective and coordinated, and
occur according to a predetermined schedule. Privacy is abolished by communal living
and by constant staff surveillance; all aspects of life are supervised and directed by a
single authority; all communications with the outside are monitored and censored, as
Kazuko realizes when the Chief Nurse confronts her with a personal letter in which she
describes the Red Cross as a “glorified prison” (Kuramoto 7–8).
24 Kazuko’s  dissatisfaction  with  institutionalized  life  makes  her  more  receptive  to  the
subversive discourse she encounters in a letter from her childhood friend, Kunio. Bitter
over the conduct of the war and the Japanese military and the civilian elite’s blindness to
impending  defeat,  Kunio  lashes  out  against  the  generational  sacrifice  in  pursuit  of
national goals. He and Kazuko realize that war quickly turns from a profession, or a duty,
or a romantic adventure, into an existential condition in which the individual is entirely
at the mercy of vast and irresistible forces locked in their own operational logic. Drilling,
coordination,  the  use  of  technology,  industrial  and  strategic  planning,  give  war  an
appearance of rationality that does not hold up against the reality of its conduct. In this
exchange, Kunio and Kazuko have glimpsed the fundamental nature of the modern state:
the inclusion of biological life in the calculations of sovereign power; a condition clearly
reflected in the total character of modern warfare which, in turn, is best defined as the
mobilization of civil society and all national productive forces to one single end (cf. Poggi
112).
25 Since no aspect of social and individual life is exempt from state interest, if not direct
supervision, the aims of industrialized warfare are radicalized in the contraposition of
total victory to total defeat. A case in point is the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945,
with  which  the  U.S.,  Britain,  and  China  demanded  Japan’s  unconditional  surrender,
promising  utter  destruction  if  the  terms  were  not  accepted.  Japanese  negotiators
unsuccessfully  sought  a  Russian  mediation  to  obtain acceptable  peace  terms;  they
proposed  disarmament  and  demobilization,  the  conduct  of  war-crime  trials  under
Japanese law. However, the terms excluded explicitly the presence of occupation forces
on the home islands, and required the preservation of the figure of the Emperor. At this
point in the war it was clear that, for the Japanese, “unconditional surrender [was] the
only obstacle to peace” (Zinn 423). Clearly, f or the upper echelons of the Japanese Army
annihilation was preferable to the complete surrender of national sovereignty, and, even
after the allies made good on their promise of destruction by dropping the first atomic
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bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,  army representatives  continued to maintain that
Japan should resist invasion at all costs (Beasley 249).
26 In the nation-state model, any loss or limitation of sovereignty appears to political actors
as an existential threat to the state and the entire national population. War of this kind,
total war, dramatizes to the point of absurdity the crucial link between the attribute of
nationality and political citizenship for the determination of what constitutes a human
being and a life worth living. The prospect of losing citizenship rights is, thus, terrifying,
as is clearly exemplified in Kuramoto’s record of the fear and sense of abandonment that
engulfs  the  colonists  after  the  Japanese  surrender,  notably  before her  home town is
overrun by enemy troops. With the sudden collapse of the imperial structure, she and her
family are transformed instantly into refugees in her native Manchuria. Indeed, the very
intensity  of  her  reaction  to  the  radio  announcement  of  the  surrender  reveals  the
ideological inevitability of the nation in modern state politics, and the subordination of
individual identity to the national idea.
27 From the inception of her memoir, Kuramoto makes it quite clear that she considered
Manchuria her home. It is also clear that, by joining the Red Cross, she proclaims her
loyalty to Japan, to which Manchuria is politically attached, but from which it remains
geographically, historically, and culturally distinct. Piqued by her display of patriotism,
cousin Toru provokes her into a  clever “nationality game” in which statelessness  is,
simultaneously, square one and the highest penalty. After baiting her to say that Koreans
are  “almost”  Japanese,  he  asks:  “Suppose  you  were  stateless,  and  given  a  choice  of
becoming  Korean or  Manchurian,  which  would  you  choose?”  Unhesitatingly,  Kazuko
answers “Manchurian” and argues that her choice is motivated exclusively by familiarity
with Dairen and her complete ignorance of Korea (Kuramoto 25). Toru, who expected this
answer, readily counters that, as a Manchurian Nisei, she is equally ignorant of Japan.
What is, then, the source of a connection so powerful to induce her to put her life on hold
and don a uniform that symbolizes loyal service to a country she has never seen? After
all, as Toru understands, the choice is between two equally alien alternatives of national
affiliation.
28 Kuramoto’s  immediate  rejection  of  Korea  is disingenuous,  but  very  revealing  of  the
contradiction between the nationality principle and the political economy of imperialistic
expansionism. According to Kazuko, Koreans were almost Japanese. In other words, the
annexation of 1910 made them part of the Japanese state,  as subjects,  but not of the
Japanese nation. Since nationality is now crucially linked with sovereignty,  even in a
constitutional monarchy like Japan at the time, it cannot be diluted without endangering
the already precarious stability of the entire political structure. Kazuko’s argument is
particularly interesting because her peculiar subject position as a Nisei induces her to
answer Toru’s challenge by selectively applying the two principles by which citizenship is
determined: by place of birth (ius soli) and by descent (ius sanguinis). She can thus argue
that she retains a vital political connection with Japan by right of blood and claim, at the
same time, Manchurian citizenship by right of birth. Both options appear entirely natural
to her, even though they point to different geopolitical referents.
29 At this point in her life, Kazuko is still able to resolve Toru’s hypothetical because, for the
time being,  the hold of  Japanese state  power irons  out  all  inconsistencies.  After  the
Japanese defeat,  however,  as Kazuko and her family hear the Emperor announce the
unconditional surrender, the same problem will reappear with the seriousness of a life-
and-death predicament. Trapped in the provincial town of Furanten, and fearful of the
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advance of the Soviet Army from the north, Chiang Khai-shek’s Nationalist Army from
the south-east, and of the activities of the Communist guerrillas, the Japanese colonists
decide to take refuge in Dairen. When they arrive, they find the city transformed and
Kazuko realizes  quickly  that  the  privileges  she  had taken for  granted,  starting  with
segregated public transportation, had vanished. It appeared that her birthright, her blood
connection with Japan, was now worthless, and she had to start building a new identity.
With everything at stake this time, she attempts to reinvent herself as a native Dairenian,
as if the loss of Japanese imperial protection had lifted an artificial identity to reveal the
natural self underneath. However, in the logic of national identification ius soli lacks the
authenticity of blood, and therefore constitutes a weaker claim to citizenship. To bolster
her  standing,  Kuramoto’s  autobiographical  persona  attempts  to  establish  a  more
meaningful connection with the native Chinese on the cultural level, by studying the local
language. On the symbolic level, the autobiographical text then tries to bridge the bio-
political gap between self and nation by prefacing her resolution to become “naturalized”
with the childhood memory of an anonymous Chinese man saving her from drowning
(Kuramoto 70–71).  It  is a second gift of life which, Kuramoto hopes, may represent a
viable surrogate of the missing blood connection with Manchuria.
30 If her plea were successful, she may not be forced to leave her native city for a distant
place to which she felt bound by nothing more than borrowed ideological ties. Affectively,
repatriation seems tantamount to deportation, and she wishes to resist it.  But in the
“nationality game” it would be unwise to risk remaining unattached and stateless because
of misplaced sentimentality. Thus, she and her family join the Japanese refugees who
flock to Dairen from all over Manchuria and fill the city’s every nook with their politically
uncomfortable presence: “They were the forgotten people in the middle of the crowd, a
silent  discordance  in  the  maddening  crescendo”  (Kuramoto  101–102).  Discord  and
madness  symbolize  the  indeterminacy  of  their  status  as  politically  relevant  human
beings. It is an exclusion that threatens to reduce them to creatures of subsistence, naked
life waiting to be ransomed back into political existence by a state willing to call them
citizens again.
31 After having lost all hope of maintaining a meaningful connection with Dairen, Kazuko
remembers that her father had set up a lifeline with the old country. As soon as the
children were able to write, she tells us, he had forced them to memorize the family’s
legal  address  in  Japan (Kuramoto 108).  Once  again,  the  political  asserts  itself  as  the
primary ontological category in the individual’s construction of her identity. To better
understand this claim it is necessary to step back to the moment when Kazuko and her
family hear the Emperor announce the surrender in a radio broadcast. Their first reaction
is one of desperate confusion, consistent with the manufactured feelings of nationalist
doctrine  which  prompt  Kuramoto  to  describe  the  idea  of  a  Japanese  surrender  as
unthinkable.  What  is  truly  unthinkable,  however,  is  not  the  surrender  itself  but  the
consequent prospect of life under a non-national government. 
32 Unconditional surrender implies the dissolution of the sovereign power which establishes
the  boundaries  separating  a  civilized  inside  from a  hostile  and  barbaric  outside.  In
consequence of this collapse, the people of Japan, and Kuramoto with them, fear being
exposed to a violence unrestricted by the habitual bonds of mutual obligation that bind
sovereign and subject. Without an autonomous state to give shape to the corporate body
of the nation, each individual faces the terrifying prospect of having to stand alone before
a supreme force that is in no way limited by the formal constraints of law or the moral
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strictures of justice. Refugees, stateless persons, the conquered, and the interned exist in
a condition of anomie in which they may suffer violence without recourse. For these
reasons, while contemplating the possibility of defeat, Kazuko’s father is certain that the
only options are resistance to the bitter end or government-sanctioned collective suicide
(Kuramoto 40).
33 In Kuramoto’s description of the tension that follows the broadcast, confusion rapidly
gives way to anger and to a sense of betrayal because the nation-state, once thought
invincible, has allowed the veil of ontological security to be torn in this manner. Kazuko
felt “betrayed by Japan, the God-chosen country with a noble mission, the country that
could do no wrong” (Kuramoto 42). Clearly, right and wrong are understood as a function
of national sovereignty.  For as long as Japan remained independent,  it  preserved the
capacity to determine, by sovereign decision, the difference between the proper and the
improper, the lawful and the illicit, down to the basic moral concepts of right and wrong.
This is not the foundation of new ethical systems but the much more modest assertion, in
politics, of a moral relativism whose only guiding principle is the interest of the state and
of the nation, made indistinguishable. In the name of this supreme good, the sovereign
can condone and forgive any action or omission. Conversely, when the sovereign loses its
prerogatives, all acts priorly undertaken in the name of the nation are potentially subject
to criminal prosecution or outright revenge.
34 Kazuko is thus intuitively correct in her opinion that “the loser becomes the criminal and
everyone throws rocks at you” (Kuramoto 78). Furthermore, this is directly relevant to
herself since, as a former member of the Japanese Red Cross, she believes she harbors the
secret of a war crime of her own. Everyone, in post-war Japan, is implicated, but powerful
ideological  mechanisms  are  at  work  to  shift  the  blame for  the  war  onto  a  fanatical
minority, the militaristic elite, and to explain popular support and participation as an
effect of indoctrination (Kuramoto 128). The fiction of the wartime unity of the Japanese
people is substituted with the equally fictive assumption of the essential blamelessness of
the  general  population,  so  that  a  new,  peace-loving,  democratic  Japan  could  be
legitimately constructed under US supervision. Once again, Rousseau is proven correct:
the nation is never wrong. At the very least, we need it not to be, to bestow legitimacy on
a  political  order  of  which  the  nation-state  (not  the  nation)  is  the  true  constitutive
element.
35 As John Breuilly notes, “someone unfortunate enough to be excluded from the rule of a
state, a stateless person, becomes both in theory and in practice a sort of non-person”
(Breuilly  369).  Faced  with  the  problem  of  statelessness  in  a  world of  nation  states,
Kuramoto, as a Manchurian Japanese, clearly fears having become that someone. Once
the initial shock of the surrender subsides, the Japanese colonists in Manchuria realize
that the loss of sovereign protection had placed them in immediate physical danger, not
from  the  advancing  Russian  and  Nationalist  Chinese  armies,  which  may  abide  by
agreements  between  states  (improperly  called  “international”)  on  the  treatment  of
prisoners of war, but from local mobs. Suddenly, there are no laws, neither domestic nor
colonial,  to protect  them from former neighbors who feel  authorized to exact  direct
retribution for their prior subordination. In the middle of the night,  Kazuko and her
family flee to the woods to hide under cover of darkness; in the woods, their former,
markedly ideological reaction to the Emperor’s announcement begins to appear remote
and feeble. Compared to the potent rush caused by fear of immediate harm of a distinctly
physical nature, the ideological angst generated by the manufactured feelings of national
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identification,  which  prompted  them  to  wish  for  death,  appears  thoroughly
unconvincing.  At  this  point,  the  emotional  expenditure  is  enormous  and  Kazuko
succumbs to an absolute fatigue: “Suddenly, I was tired. So tired that I didn’t care what
had happened to what was going to happen” (Kuramoto 53).
36 From this  moment onward,  the narrative presents  the loss  of  status  suffered by the
Japanese  as  a  progressive  descent  into  the  survivors’  biological  nature.  Still,  their
dehumanization is never complete because their complete objectification is hindered (in
the last instance and in Agambenian fashion) by the presence of a witness, the reader,
who  is  forced  to  correlate  even  the  most  degrading  experience  suffered  by  the
autobiographical self to their own humanity. The victim of a radical exclusion is thus
reclaimed at the last moment, making the representation of complete dehumanization
impossible to realize discursively. Still, Kuramoto’s narrative contains, in Mr. Kawano, a
clear instance of pure violence of the kind identified by Agamben, which kills the human
being without destroying the biological life that sustains it. Mr. Kawano, a family friend
and former chief of police, had survived a severe beating from resentful Chinese, but
remained  brain-damaged.  When  Kuramoto  notices  him  in  a  crowd  of  refugees,  she
initially  fails  to  recognize  him.  In  this  passage,  the  deliberately  slow  pace  of  the
description matches the absolute care and attentiveness the man puts into the simple
task of peeling and eating a boiled potato. Mr. Kawano performs this task with “vacant
intensity” amidst the general apathy of bystanders (Kuramoto 102). Kazuko is horrified
by the  transfiguration of  this  formerly  vital  personality  into  a  creature  of  necessity
entirely absorbed with its own sustenance and yet barely able to procure it.
37 Reduced to almost a bundle of physiological functions, Mr. Kawano functions as the literal
and narrative embodiment of a horrific destiny that remains open for all human beings
caught in the anomie of statelessness. However, as Agamben argues, all refugees remain
in constant relation with the political, not in spite of having been pushed to the threshold
of irrelevance, but because of it. This is because the threat of radical exclusion that is a
constant prerogative of sovereign power enmeshes biological existence and political life
not only in the victim, but also in the perpetrators and the witnesses, and, in doing so,
traces the limits of the existing order across the bodies that it excludes (Agamben, Homo
28–29). For Nietzche’s Zarathustra, “Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman—a
rope over an abyss” (Nietzsche 14). Pity that modernity has tied the political end of the
rope, where our humanity is defined in relation to the humanity of others, to the state,
and the biological end, where all social and political obligations should mercifully cease,
to the nation.
38 This intimacy between life and nationhood also structures the biopolitical intuitions of
Manchurian Legacy which are voiced most forcefully when a frightened man speaks out in
the Furanten auditorium where the Japanese colonists consider whether to undertake the
perilous voyage to Dairen: 
‘We should all have died the day Japan surrendered,’ the man says. ‘Japan is crushed
and has given up Manchuria. We are abandoned. We are on our own in the middle
of the enemies. We are trapped in a no-man’s land! What’s the use of running? Let’s
finish ourselves here and now! You can get us enough arms to kill ourselves, can’t
you?’ (Kuramoto 54)
39 Abandonment by one’s national community is described as a condition not unlike death.
Unattached and forsaken, the colonists struggle to find value in a life trapped in the “no-
man’s  land”  between national  identities;  this  sentiment  is  confirmed when Kazuko’s
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father, a former public official, manages to infuse a measure of optimism in the dejected
crowd by offering his compatriots the task of rebuilding Japan from its ashes, not for
themselves,  but for the sake of the children. The unity of biology and nation is thus
reestablished, if not as a promise, at least as a possibility. Clearly, mere survival does not
suffice.
40 For  Kazuko,  however,  Japan offers  little  comfort.  Harsh post-war  conditions  and the
hostility with which she and the other refugees are received enfeeble the already tenuous
connection. If the nationality game she plays with Kunio, early in the memoir, intimates
that her patriotic sentiments are purely ideological and lack a concrete referent,  her
reaction to occupied Japan, a country she finds alien and hostile, supports this reading.
Upon arrival, the Manchurian refugees are greeted with unpleasant sanitary procedures
established by the occupation forces, which confirm their apprehensions for the absence
of  a  sympathetic  sovereign.  Thus,  upon  being  doused  with  DDT  powder,  Kuramoto
expresses her resentment to the reader with a note of bitter and distinctly unpatriotic
sarcasm: “Welcome home, you miserable maggots!  Welcome home to the land of  the
Rising Sun!” (Kuramoto 114). The fault, she seems to imply, lies with the defeated nation-
state.
41 In Kazuko’s eyes, post-war Japan is “a world with no order, no future,” a world in disarray
where nightclubs, bars, dance halls, and prostitutes cater to the desires of outsiders, and
the absence  of  an autonomous  political  order  makes  the  very  concept  of  the  future
meaningless (Kuramoto 146). By contrast, the future figures prominently in the fictitious
life  of  the  nation-state  as  modern  ideological  construct:  the  future  of  technological
progress,  the  future  of  national  reform,  reconstitution,  and  aggrandizement,  or  the
messianic future of emancipation. Without the sovereign’s representation of an order in
which such a desirable future might occur, all that is left is an eternal present, dominated
by necessity, with no purpose beyond simple being. In order to break out of this eternal
present,  in  the  Furanten  auditorium,  Kazuko’s  father  appealed  to  his  compatriots’
national pride to create the illusion of a future for which it  might be worthwhile to
survive and sacrifice. Ironically, back in Japan, his own daughter is unable to embrace
that  fiction  and  her  unorthodox  behavior  leads  to  her  further  marginalization.  Her
relationship with an American civilian in particular is construed as a betrayal of her
obligations  towards  family  and  nation,  leading  her  mother  to  regard  her  as  a  war
casualty. By contrast, her decision to join the Red Cross without consulting her parents
did not elicit a reaction so extreme.
42 Each stage of Kazuko’s metaphoric descent from full humanity towards mere biological
life  is  marked  by  the  loss  of  a  particular  ordering  principle  of  social  life.  The  first
structure to fail  her is the nation, whose military defeat and occupation signaled the
inability of the sovereign to guarantee the political space in which qualified existence is
possible. As a result of this failure, during Kuramoto’s time as a refugee in Dairen, the
family had to step in and shoulder the entire burden of structuring group identification
for its  members.  The family thus regressed beyond both its  modern function and its
traditional, pre-modern function, to its primeval role of coordinating a barely (though
sufficiently) productive division of labor, and providing its members with a reasonably
effective mutual support system. It did not, however, revert to the level of Durkheimian
mechanical  solidarity;  the  chronic  uncertainty  of  necessity-driven  post-war  living
conditions ensured that role assignment within the group remain relatively loose rather
than rigid.
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43 Paradoxically, with everyone taking multiple roles as need dictates, it is as if the refugees
had attained a higher level of individual indifferentiation within the new group-category
created by the emergency; higher, that is, than was allowed in a traditional family, under
normal circumstances. A clear indication of relaxed role-assigning is the sudden inclusion
of Kazuko in conversations on unseemly subjects like rape, prostitution, and abortion
from which, in different circumstances, she would have been excluded (Kuramoto 90).
This indicates that the boundary between maiden and woman is no longer patrolled by
family enforcers of social convention, because it is no longer relevant. The family still
provides  some  degree  of  differentiation,  but  the  inherent  social,  economic,  and
existential instability of the refugee’s Umwelt (environment, or subjective world) prevents
it  from becoming the  authoritative  structure  that  determines  the  boundaries  within
which the individual  must  construct  their  sense of  self  against  the push and pull  of
individualization (autonomy) and indifferentiation (conformity).
44 In post-war Japan, however, this autonomy dissipates and, in the general anomie, parents
relinquish  their  authority  over  their  children  as  if  parental  qualifications  were
conditional on the success or failure of the nation. Only later in the process of national
reconstruction the family reasserts itself,  not like in Dairen, as a site of security and
freedom (limited only by necessity), but as the enforcer of collective values. When Kazuko
chooses  to  associate  with  an  American,  she  undermines  the  slow  and  painstaking
reestablishment of a clear distinction between inside and outside, between what is Japan
and what is foreign. Military occupation has broken the unity of people and territory on
which depends the legitimacy of the modern nation-state, and has muddled the friend-
enemy distinction that is,  for Schmitt,  the essence of the political (Schmitt).  In these
conditions,  a  viable  discourse  of  national  sovereignty  must  perforce  stress  social
separation to compensate for the temporary impossibility of  true political  autonomy.
Kazuko’s violation is therefore unforgivable, and it warrants her social death. Banished
from her  native  Manchuria  and,  now,  rejected by her family  for  failing to  conform,
Kazuko’s isolation and dejection deepen until the human is pushed to the margins of the
narrative and almost erased. In the narrative, this effect can only be achieved obliquely.
Any attempt to engage the reader directly would nullify the erasure by drawing attention
to the protagonist’s jeopardized humanity and thus produce pathos. Instead, Kuramoto is
able to displace, for a moment, the presence of the narrator’s consciousness with the
image of the cicada call: “There is no music in the call of the cicada. No joy, no life. It is a
gloomy and irritating noise, made by the scraping of their membranes, amplified by the
hollow space in the insect’s abdomen. They live only long enough to mate and lay eggs”
(Kuramoto 147).
45 Hollowness, sound without structure, life without qualification (without joy) all hint at
the gradual impoverishment of Kazuko’s perceptive horizon as a sign of her progressive
desubjecitification.  It  lasts  only  a  moment  (rhetorically),  but  the  experience  is
comparable  to  the  extreme  processes  of  subjectification/desubjectification  Agamben
describes in Remnants of Auschwitz. Agamben starts from the premise that subjectivity is a
defining characteristic of “man,” though not an essential characteristic of the human
animal. In other words, the structure of subjectivity is neither primary nor necessary for
the functioning of the organism. Subjectivity is, rather, what is at stake in the modalities
of our relation with the objects and conditions that fall within our subjective universe,
our Umwelt.ii The more restrictive our conditions of existence, the more our subjectivity
diminishes in depth and range. Nowhere has this phenomenon been more visible than in
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Auschwitz, a location devoted to the desubjectification of the individual and, to put it
bluntly, the industrial production of corpses. Primo Levi and other witnesses of the Shoah
provide Agamben with the measure of the success of this program in the tragic figure of
the Muselmann,  Levi's “total witness” in whom the person is transformed into a non-
person while the body still lives (Levi 91–92).
46 For Agamben, human subjectivity is given at the point of intersection of four ontological
operators,  or  currents:  “possibility”  and  “contingency”  as  the  operators  of
subjectification, and “impossibility” and “necessity” as the operators of desubjectification
(Agamben,  Remnants 148).  Subjectivity appears between power and impotence,  as  the
possibility (not the choice) of an autonomous self in relation to a contingency. When the
contingent is eclipsed by the necessary, Agamben argues, the self can no longer (or less
and less) position itself as subject, but it does not, for this reason, cease to exist. On the
contrary,  even  in  the  extreme  conditions  that  produced  the  liminal  figure  of  the
Muselmann, the non-human survives the human as a continuation of naked life. This sea-
change from person to object is never complete or irreversible since, for Agamben, there
is no human essence to be destroyed or saved. There is only a fracture between life and
logos, an ontological gap in which the human being appears as the threshold across which
flow the currents of subjectification and desubjectification (Agamben, Remnants 134–135).
For this reason, no matter how radical the process of desubjectification, it  can never
result in the complete reduction of the subject to an object, or in the perfect identity
between the human and the non-human (cf. Bataille 221; Scheler 208)
47 The closest analogy to the Muselmann in Manchurian Legacy is (not without irony due to his
role  in  Japanese  repressive  state  apparatus)  the  already  mentioned  police  chief  Mr.
Kawano whose  embarrassing resuscitation as  a  creature  of  necessity  is  witnessed by
Kazuko. The witness,  however,  is  herself  caught in the downward spiral  of necessity.
Indeed, she reaches the most complete form of desubjectification after her repatriation to
Japan, at the moment when, excluded from her family, she loses this last structure of
identification.  When,  in  this  condition,  the  naked  sound  of  the  cicada  catches  her
attention, the perceiving “I” is reduced, by juxtaposition, to mere biological datum, to
existing “only long enough to mate and lay eggs,” in a damning, living indictment of the
failure of nation and family to open possibilities for the autonomous self rather than
foreclose them in the interest  of  nondifferentiation (Kuramoto 147).  Could she,  then,
follow a friend’s advice, and live life as she sees fit? Unfortunately, freedom of this kind is
not available to her. Only John, her American partner, seems to be able to exist outside
the constraints of civilization, perhaps only because Japan is, to him, a foreign world of
temporary residence. When Kazuko realizes that he, too, has betrayed her, she attempts
suicide, but not for John’s sake. The desire to cease to exist, as she frames it, is linked to
feelings  of  intense  homesickness  for  Dairen  that  have  perdured  ever  since  her
repatriation, four years earlier.
48 Kazuko tries to end her life by ingesting an excessive dose of the sleeping pills she was
taking to control her insomnia, the physical symptom of an existential distress. Unable to
sleep,  she  spends  her  nights  watching  war  movies  and  war-related  newsreels.  Her
fascination  with  this  material  clearly  indicates  that  it  bears  some  relevance  to  her
personal situation, although, for the moment, the link remains obscure. After her failed
suicide, and after she is pronounced lucky to have survived, we learn, from a flashback to
a conversation among “colonial-born repatriates,” that the mesmerizing war scenes on
TV  seemed  to  represent  a  preemptive  solution  to  their  predicament  of  biopolitical
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indeterminacy. It is clear to them that no positive value can be attached to mere survival
and that a qualified death, the death of a national hero, might be preferable: “Then a
mournful groan came out from the darkness, ‘Lucky were those who have died in glory.’ ‘Yeah, had
they believed in it,’ quickly responded a cynic. ‘They did! I know they did!’ an angry voice hissed at
the cynic” (Kuramoto 164; emphasis in original). The cynic must be silenced to maintain
the illusion that a certain kind of death can provide the meaning that escapes a certain
kind of life.
49 If Kazuko’s attempted suicide marks the lowest point of her descent towards biological
life devoid of political relevance, the next chapter, the last in the memoir (except for the
short epilogue), signifies her acquisition of a new, politically viable identity. This ascent
from the merely biological to the political, however, cannot be accomplished outside the
established category of national identification. Since she has lost all connections with
Manchuria, and since her inability to conform prevents her from establishing new links
with  Japan,  she  must  find  a  third  alternative.  This  opportunity  comes  through  her
marriage with an American, John, which gives her access to US citizenship. It allows her
to do what colonialism and war denied her in Dairen: to make a conscious commitment of
allegiance to a single country of her choice — a commitment that she seals by renouncing
her  Japanese  citizenship  immediately  after  becoming  a  naturalized  American.  From
experience, she has clearly learnt that, in time of conflict, only unambiguous affiliation to
a single nation-state can offer a limited guarantee of (physical and ontological) security,
especially  to  those  who  straddle  borders  that  the  nation-state  system,  in  its  logic,
understands as absolute biopolitical divides. Still,  that protection remains conditional.
One’s presence may not constitute a disturbance to the perceived internal homogeneity
(nondifferentiation) of the national population, whether measured with an ethnic, racial,
or cultural yardstick. At the same time, the subject must never represent a threat to the
claimed homogeneity of the nation-state by confusing (culturally, racially, or ethnically)
the inside with the outside, the friend with the enemy. Confusion of this kind played an
important part in the internment of Japanese Americans during the war.
50 Participation in a corporate body is always a matter of affiliation, from Latin affiliare (to
adopt).  Birth might  enter  an individual  into an assortment  of  rights  and obligations
towards a larger community, but it does not guarantee that membership will never be
revoked.  This  possibility  gives  substance  to  social  pressures  to  conform in  order  to
demonstrate  that  one  is  deserving  of  being  part  of  the  group.  A  sufficiently  grave
violation  of  group  values  or  interests  may  warrant  expulsion  or,  to  use  Agamben’s
terminology, banishment. The subject of the ban is then no longer protected by the laws
and customs of the collectivity and is deprived of the possibility of recourse and redress.
The law itself withdraws from the banished, leaving them completely vulnerable before
their former community, before the world, and before nature (Agamben, Homo 17–18; 28–
29).
51 As  if  to  underscore  this  essential  yet  hidden  component  of  national  affiliation,
Kuramoto’s memoir ends with two adoptions: the first is her acquisition of American
citizenship, which naturalizes her elective membership in the nation; the second is her
adoption of a child of mixed ancestry, Junko, whose name she changes to June-Marie, and
whom she begins to permeate with an American identity:
I took her to the P.X. (post exchange) to buy her a few necessities such as jeans, T-
shirts, and sneakers. A transformation, the creation of an ‘American’ girl. Then I
noticed.  I  noticed  that  in  her  old  neighborhood  Junko  had  stood  out,  looking
Caucasian,  and  now  in  her  new  neighborhood  on  the  American  army  post  she
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looked surprisingly Japanese. My friends smiled at her and whispered to me, ‘She is
beautiful. What nationality is she?’ (Kuramoto 168)
52 Kuramoto is  certainly not naive about the difficulties  of  integration,  especially when
one’s appearance does not match the current ideal representation of the biological body
on which political homogeneity is predicated. Still, she is not discouraged by ethnic or
racial barriers and finds comfort in her adoptive daughter’s feistiness. She interprets it as
an indication that June-Marie will not accept being marginalized. At the same time, she
associates the visible expression of national affiliation with a necessity of life, a condition
of human happiness. It is as if the family were unable to sustain the happiness of its
members without attaching itself to a fully legitimate corporate body: the nation. When
that connection is abruptly severed, as was the case with Kazuko in Dairen, the loss of
identity can be catastrophic. Paradoxically, the modern ideal of a universal humanity
(with all attendant human rights) is recognizable in the individual only in relation to the
fictive  life  of  the  state,  mediated  by  the concept  of  citizenship.  Thus,  any  real  or
perceived threat to the individual’s full inclusion, any real or perceived attack on the
existing homogeneity, and any attempt to reconfigure it according to different criteria of
inclusion, will excite intense defensive reactions. Some social actors will take refuge in
nationalism and pledge their unconditional loyalty to the collective entity by parading its
symbols (the anthem and the flag), which are inevitably also the symbols of the state;
others, like Kazuko Kuramoto, may seek assimilation in a new national community. It
bears noting that Kazuko’s acquisition of American citizenship and her adoption of Junko
are  both  juridical  acts  by  which  the  recipients  are  taken  across  the  threshold  that
separates what is inside the political order from what lies outside.
53 Kazuko Kuramoto’s experience between Manchuria, Japan and the United States shows
how thoroughly these new forms of national identification envelop the individual, to the
point  of  representing  the  sole  possible  foundation  of  a  worthwhile  existence.
Colonization, war, defeat and military occupation of the home country force Manchurian
Legacy to  deal  with the eruption,  within the existing order,  of  anomic spaces  where
individuals  are  divested  of  the  prerogatives  that  come  with  citizenship.  Kuramoto’s
defense against anomie is to seek new options of national affiliation in the acquisition of
American citizenship, which certainly marks a high point in the narrative, alongside the
adoption of June-Marie. Ironically, only a few years earlier American citizenship, whether
acquired  through  birth  or  naturalization,  would  have  offered  her  no  protection  in
wartime United States; she would have been evacuated to concentration camps with the
rest  of  the  West-Coast  Issei  and  Nisei  (cf.  Commission  on  Wartime  Relocation  and
Internment of Civilians; Weglyn). Clearly, the salvific quality of Kuramoto’s new status is
specific to her situation and cannot be generalized.
54 The  memoir  ends  with  a  somber  reference  to  Japanese  orphans  who,  having  been
abandoned in Manchuria,  were raised,  oblivious of  their nationality,  by local  Chinese
families. In adulthood, many of these returned to Japan in search of their roots. Kuramoto
blames  imperialism and  war  for  creating  conditions  in  which  individuals  cannot  be
content with familial happiness but must wander the world, seeking a place where the
congruity  of  state  and  nation  would  promise  them meaning  beyond  mere  existence
(Kuramoto 176). The hidden content of this restlessness is the search for a clear sign of
unequivocal recognition by a national state in the form of full and undisputed citizenship.
From this relation between state and individual,  mutual obligations arise that can be
mediated very effectively, for both parties, through nationalistic discourse.
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55 Manchurian Legacy shows how identities are constructed in unequal transactions between
the individual and a single state entity, often at the expense of intermediate social groups
like the family. The nation-state system represents, for individual nation-states, a more
general  structure  which,  unlike  the  abstract  yet  all-embracing notion  of  humanity,
contains  entities  that  are  irreducibly  antagonistic  to  each  other  because,  extending
Simmel’s heuristic from the social to the political sphere, this antagonism guarantees
their  external  individuality  and  internal  nondifferentiation.  Kuramoto’s  singular  life
story also suggests that, for the modern individual, the urgency of identification with a
national  referent  is  not  solely  the  product  of  these  sets  of  multiple  antagonisms/
recognitions between nation-states;  it  derives,  also, from her anxiety over the risk of
becoming stateless and of being thus banished to the non-place of modern politics where
no transaction involving mutual recognition with a sovereign power is offered to shield
the  individual  from  the  absolute  vulnerability  of  a  bare  life  devoid  of  political
significance. 
56 When it comes to our relation with sovereign power and its prerogative to define the
boundaries  of  political  relevance  and  moral  action,  the  question  that  remains
unanswered is, where can the modern individual find the elbow room to preserve the
autonomy of the self as an ethical agent in the world? Could this be done in reasonable
safety, without resorting to self-denying sacrifice? Kuramoto’s memoir can help frame
the problem by showing how we become implicated in the biopolitical mechanisms that
govern modern politics, and how much is at stake when the ties that bind us to the state
in a relation of mutual recognition are, for any reason, rescinded. The loss is complete.
Given propitious circumstances, it is possible to find a remedy within the global system
itself  by shifting affiliation with a juridical  act,  as  does Kuramoto;  still,  this  solution
leaves one forever vulnerable to restrictive claims made on nativist grounds. Absence of a
political referent shielding the individual from the brutal forces of necessity,  be they
natural or man-made, abandons the human being in a space where the exercise of power
knows no limits, nor does the violence against those who are excluded from a reciprocal
relation with the sovereign. 
57 Although  the  modern  (western  or  westernized)  world  belongs,  ideologically,  to  the
individual (one thinks of the Cartesian subject), the seemingly infinite possibilities for
individualization produced by political, social, and technological modernity are boxed in
by the biopolitical boundaries of nondifferentiation at the national level. Individuals who,
for any reason, find themselves in the interstitial spaces between state-attached national
identities, uncover, as their defining existential trait, not the unadulterated core of their
own humanity,  but  an emptiness  and a  solitude that  coincides  with the unmediated
awareness of their naked, biological life. Modernity is not the cause of that emptiness and
solitude;  but  it  has  generated  a  set  of  historical  circumstances  which  forces  this
awareness on larger and larger numbers who become trapped between an impossible
demand of conformity and the terror of complete autonomy.
58 i. Notes
59  Kuramoto’s experience is far from unique. The refugee problem exploded in Europe after
the First World War when displaced populations numbering in the millions were shifted
from one nation-state to the next as Europe’s political geography was being redrawn to
reflect  the  nationality  principle  (Kolko).  In  1939,  Sir  John Simpson Hope compiled a
report on the refugee problem for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, from the
First  World  War  to  the  Nazi  expulsion of  German Jews  in  the  mid  and late  thirties
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(Simpson). Hannah Arendt relied on this report for her theory of statelessness. Displaced
populations, Arendt argues, concluded correctly that loss of national rights implied the
loss of human rights since the latter have no juridical platform on which to stand save the
state-sanctioned institute of citizenship (Arendt 292).
60 ii.  Agamben borrows the term Umwelt from early nineteenth-century zoologist Jakob von
Uexküll who developed a theory of meaning according to which living organisms exist in
unique and complete subjective universes that are constructed on the basis of the insight
provided by receptor organs and effective organs locked in a functional cycle. It follows
that there are as many subjective universes as there are subjects perceiving them, and
that  they  are  of  greater  or  lesser  complexity  depending  on  the  complexity  of  the
organism. Objects populate these universes, richly or sparsely, as meaning carriers (von
Uexküll 31).
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ABSTRACTS
This article investigates the significance of Kazuko Kuramoto’s Manchurian Legacy: Memoirs of a
Japanese Colonist (1999) as a life narrative that foregrounds the biopolitical implications of modern
subjectivity in the context of the global system of nation states. Using the theoretical insights of,
primarily, Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, and Georg Simmel, I argue that Kuramoto’s record of
her  own  experience  between  Manchuria,  Japan,  and  the  United  States,  showcases  the
fundamental conflict between the nation and the family as the largest and smallest social circles
vying for the individual’s allegiance. This discussion will show that the nation-state’s claim is
preeminent and that the political is fundamental to the construction of a viable subjectivity in
the modern world, leaving complete exclusion as the only alternative.
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